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Abstract 
This paper focuses on market discipline as a necessary condition to preserve the signaling 
content of balance sheet indicators and market prices as macroprudential tools. It argues 
that market discipline enhances the information content of market prices by reflecting the 
expected private cost of financial distress, including the systemic importance of particular 
firms. This paper also argues that three conditions are necessary for market discipline to be 
effective: adequate and timely information on financial institutions’ risk profiles; financial 
institutions’ creditors must consider themselves at risk; and the reaction to market signals 
needs to be observable. The paper relies on the existing financial literature and it is 
particularly timely because policymakers are considering structural measures of banks’ 
systemic importance as a benchmark for macroprudential policy. 
Keywords: Financial crisis, international financial markets, financial regulation, financial 
institutions, bankruptcy, liquidation. 
JEL classification: G02, G17, G19, G21, G29, G34. 
 
 
 
 
  
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 8 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 1202 
Resumen 
La disciplina de mercado es condición necesaria para preservar el contenido informativo de los 
indicadores de balance y los precios de mercado como herramientas utilizadas en el análisis 
macroprudencial. Tanto los indicadores de balance como los precios de mercado son utilizados 
como indicadores de importancia sistémica y crisis financiera. Tres condiciones son necesarias 
para que la disciplina de mercado sea efectiva: información veraz y oportuna sobre el perfil de 
riesgo de las instituciones financieras; los acreedores deben estar expuestos al riesgo; y la 
reacción a los indicadores de mercado debe ser observable. 
Palabras clave: Crisis financiera, mercados financieros internacionales, regulación financiera, 
instituciones financieras, quiebra, liquidación. 
Códigos JEL: G02, G17, G19, G21, G29, G34. 
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1 Introduction 
The present financial crisis, whose epicenter was in the most sophisticated financial markets 
in the United States and the European Union (EU), has tested the national and international 
preparedness to deal with financial instability.1 In their quest to ensure financial stability, 
governments launched bail-outs that have been costly for taxpayers and have prompted 
policymakers to review a wide range of policy areas including monetary policy, prudential 
supervision and resolution of failed financial institutions. In this context, central banks´ macro 
prudential policy has attracted particular attention. Although the theoretical and empirical 
literature is still in its very early stages, there is a consensus among policymakers that the 
main objective of macroprudential policy is to reduce systemic risk and enable the continuous 
functioning of the financial system, without costly bail-outs for taxpayers. In contrast to 
microprudential policy, macroprudential policy takes into consideration risk factors that go 
beyond individual financial institutions, including shock correlations and interactions between 
institutions in their response to shocks. The macroprudential approach relies on the notion 
that “risk” is endogenous. 
For the purpose of this paper, systemic risk is defined as the risk of a widespread 
crisis in the financial system. Other definitions also highlight the impact on the real economy. 
IMF/BIS/FSB (2009) define systemic risk as “a risk of disruption to financial services that is  
(i) caused by an impairment of all parts of the financial system and (ii) has the potential to have 
serious negative consequences for the real economy.” Systemic risk is a negative externality 
that policymakers need to tackle via macroprudential regulation.  
The only recent academic and policy literature on the operational framework of 
macroprudential policy has focused on crisis prevention and not on crisis management 
(Borio and Drehman, 2009). The present paper challenges Borio and Drehman´s view that 
crisis management policies are not pre-emptive in their orientation and are relevant only 
when the crisis has unfolded. Their view neglects the preventive policy aspects of failed 
bank resolutions that aim at minimizing the aggregate credit and liquidity losses to the 
financial system by allowing markets to continue functioning. Supervisors´ prompt 
corrective policy together with banks´ mandatory contingent convertible bonds and a 
credible resolution regime if an institution is clearly insolvent, and ideally combined with 
bail-in approaches, contribute to preserving not only financial stability but also the 
information content of market signals. 
This paper focuses on market discipline as a necessary condition to preserve the 
signaling content of balance sheet indicators and market prices as macroprudential tools. It 
argues that market discipline enhances the information content of market prices by reflecting 
the expected private cost of financial distress, including the systemic importance of particular 
firms. This paper also argues that three conditions are necessary for market discipline to be 
effective: adequate and timely information on financial institutions´ risk profiles; financial 
institutions´ creditors must consider themselves at risk; and the reaction to market signals 
needs to be observable. The analysis relies on the existing financial literature and it is 
                                                                          
1. No generally accepted definition of financial stability exists. See Padoa-Schioppa (2003), Schinasi (2004) and 
Goodhart (2009) ; these definitions emphasize the robustness of the financial system to either external shocks or shocks 
originated within the financial system and the sources of systemic risk for which there is a consensus definition.  
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particularly timely because policymakers are considering structural measures of banks´ 
systemic importance as a benchmark for macroprudential policy. 
The remainder of this paper is divided into three sections. Section one elaborates on 
the necessary conditions for effective market discipline and analyzes its role in enhancing the 
information value of market indicators. Section two briefly comments on the use of market 
and balance sheet indicators in macroprudential policy as measures of the systemic 
importance of financial institutions and risk indicators of financial instability. The last section 
concludes and presents some policy recommendations that focus mainly on three aspects of 
market discipline: reorganization and resolution of failed financial institutions; accounting 
frameworks; and supervisory disclosure and financial information gaps. 
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2 Effectiveness of market discipline in its supporting role of macroprudential 
policy: Preconditions for effective market discipline 
Neither policy makers nor academics have paid much attention to the supporting role  
of market discipline in macroprudential policy in spite of the fact that, at this point in time, 
macroprudential policy importantly relies on market prices and balance sheet indicators  
as measures of systemic importance and future financial distress. Academics often assume 
that market prices reflect all the available public and private information. However, a macro 
prudential framework that relies on market prices only assumes that markets are 
informationally efficient, hence, the importance of transparency and disclosure in the effective 
functioning of a market discipline regime. The underlying rational is that disclosure allows 
counterparty surveillance and makes markets more efficient in the sense that they embody 
the knowledge that market participants have. However, disclosure is only one condition  
for the effectiveness of market discipline. Disclosure provides investors with the necessary 
information to assess the risk that they will have to bear including the possibility of losses, and 
that promotes better risk pricing. Market discipline could be understood as higher rates on 
liabilities associated with higher risk, which reduces the risks taken by banks. In sum, it is the 
expectations that financial costs will have to be borne that makes market discipline work. 
The effectiveness of market prices and balance sheet indicators as measuring tools 
of systemic importance and financial distress rests on the presumption that markets can be 
relied upon to exert discipline on risk taking of financial institutions. Market indicators have the 
advantage of being available frequently (mostly daily) for financial institutions that tap funds 
from the markets and that makes them particularly useful in macroprudential policy. Since 
the 1990´s, policy makers have stressed the role of market discipline as a pillar for a safe 
and efficient financial system. However, the crisis has considerably weakened policy 
makers´ reliance on market discipline, interestingly enough, in part, as a result of their 
intervention. Large market failures that occurred in the run up to the financial crisis were 
caused to a substantial extent by an inappropriate institutional framework that made bail 
outs of financial institutions inevitable. Three conditions are necessary for market discipline 
to be effective: adequate and timely information on financial institutions´ risk profiles; 
financial institutions´ creditors must consider themselves at risk; and the reaction to market 
signals needs to be observable. 
Adequate and timely information on financial institutions’ risk profiles:  
In practice, even if markets are efficient from the informational point of view, all relevant 
private information may not be available at all times because information is costly. As 
compared to markets, prudential supervisors have a comparative advantage to compel 
revelation of private information from financial institutions. If prudential supervisors have 
access to private information that allows a more accurate assessment of their financial 
condition on a timelier basis, market discipline might be improved by the public 
disclosure of supervisors´ ratings. All of this raises a number of policy issues: Are markets 
or prudential supervisors more timely and accurate in assessing a financial institutions´ 
financial condition? Should prudential supervisors disclose more information? Is publicly 
available information sufficient? What needs to be disclosed and to whom should the 
disclosures be made?  
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Berger et alli. (1998) study the policy choices regarding supervisory versus market 
discipline based on the timeliness and accuracy of the information sets of supervisors and 
bond ratings and stock returns of large U.S. bank holding companies.2 In their study, bank 
supervisors and bond rating agencies primarily represent debt holders and, as such, their 
ratings reflect the probabilities and severities of default. The authors conclude that bond rating 
agencies tend to predict future bank defaults consistent with their incentives regarding default 
risk, while supervisors do not contribute substantially to predicting future values of large 
banks´ performance after taking into account market assessments. Supervisors emphasize 
“current” condition and when their assessment is “fresh” after an inspection, they “generally 
contribute substantially to forecasting future performance and often exceed the contribution 
of market´s assessments.” Evanoff and Wall (2002) found that subordinated debt yield 
spreads produced more accurate predictions of upcoming confidential supervisory ratings 
than did bank’s risk-based regulatory capital ratios. This was partly explained because 
accounting measures were not market based and allowed for supervisory discretion. 
However, because they also found that both risk measures contain substantial noise, they 
suggest limiting the use of subordinated debt only as a failsafe mechanism to identify critically 
undercapitalized banks. In sum, the findings of Berger et alli. (1998) and Evanoff and Wall 
(2002) seem to leave quite unresolved the question of whether markets or supervisors are the 
best governance over large banks in the US. Notwithstanding, both seem to imply that more 
supervisory disclosure would enhance the accuracy of market indicators. Against this 
background, it could be argued that supervisors´ communication of their monitoring and 
systemic assessments to the financial institutions as well as communication of the changes in 
the stringency of their supervisory approach to the market could be considered 
macroprudential policy instruments. By influencing the behavior of market participants, 
supervisors´ communication may help to contain system-wide risks (BIS, 2010 p.9). In  
turn, supervisors´ forbearance introduces uncertainty as to the timing and amount of losses to 
which creditors are exposed.  
The market assessment of risks relies on auditors and supervisors to enforce not 
only honest accounting but also accounting frameworks that allow for the prompt recognition 
of losses.3 The first line of defense for enforcing compliance with accounting rules is the 
external auditors of a financial institution. However, the total impact of external auditors is 
hard to judge, as there is rarely any public disclosure when a financial institution changes  
its balance sheet valuation in response to its external auditor’s opinion. Moreover, legally 
accepted accounting frameworks allow for a considerable degree of discretion. In an 
environment of depressed asset prices, Huizinga and Laeven (2009) analyze a good example 
of accounting discretion as a mechanism to reveal asymmetric information to investors that 
weakens market discipline. The authors show that banks use accounting discretion to 
maintain accounting solvency by overstating the value of distressed assets in their portfolios 
of assets held to maturity (mortgage backed securities –MBS– and real estate loans), which 
are carried at amortized cost. This was reflected in the market value of banks with large 
portfolios of MBS reacting favorably to accounting rules amendments aimed at allowing 
additional discretion in the determination of fair value of securities when markets are illiquid. 
Against this background, Huizinga and Laeven conclude that replacing the mixed model of 
accounting based on both amortized cost and fair value with a model based entirely on fair 
value accounting would mitigate incentives for accounting arbitrage and could serve to 
                                                                          
2. These authors consider the timeliness and accuracy of the information in the supervisory and market assessments but 
they do not consider its costs. Their study assumes that information is costless.  
3. Bank supervisors do not always enforced timely recognition of losses as suggested by Eisenbeis and Wall (2002) in 
the context of the implementation of Prompt Corrective Action in the US. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 13 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 1202 
improve the information value of public accounts. However, the effectiveness of capital 
requirements depends entirely on the proper valuation of assets and liabilities and the  
timey recognition of impairment. In times of crisis, market prices are driven by liquidity 
provision incentives and not fundamental values; hence, an accounting framework that 
entirely relies on mark-to-market values is not adequate to assess the solvency of financial 
institutions as a “going concern.” However, accounting standards and regulatory standards 
have different objectives and goals. Most important is that prudential regulators are 
accountable for explaining deviations from accounting standards. Publication of stress tests 
could be an ex ante accountability mechanism. Also, for the sake of transparency for markets 
and policy makers, market prices could be supplemented with both model-based and 
amortized cost valuations in financial crisis situations.  
Both prudential supervisors and market participants also rely on the availability  
of sufficient and comparable information in order to comprehensively and accurately  
assess both the systemic importance of financial institutions and the signals of financial 
distress. Financial information needs to be comparable in terms of valuation criteria for 
assets, liabilities and off-balance sheet items.4 Moreover, because macroprudential policy 
takes into consideration shock correlations and interactions between institutions in their 
response to common shocks, financial information on “interconnectedness” and 
“substitutability” is necessary. Regarding “interconnectedness” among financial institutions 
both domestically and internationally, the most obvious data gaps are the information on 
the detailed composition by asset type of the “trading” and “available for sale” assets´ 
portfolio; detailed information on the lending to and borrowing from banks and non deposit 
financial institutions; and the information on the counterparties of credit lines and other off-
balance sheet items. Regarding “substitutability”, the obvious data gaps are the value of 
assets for which banks act as custodians, the values and shares of large value payments 
settled by banks and the values and shares of global securities settled by banks.  
This information is of utmost importance for macroprudential policy makers, but financial 
institutions would be reluctant to publicly disclose it out of competitiveness concerns.  
To the extent they do not embed market views about “interconnectedness” and 
“substitutability,” market prices would only partially reflect credit risk, limiting their 
usefulness as macroprudential indicators. Nonetheless, policy makers could use private 
information on “interconnectedness” and “substitutability” to supplement market prices  
as indicators of systemic importance of financial institutions and signals of financial distress. 
Financial institutions´ creditors must consider themselves at risk and the reaction  
to market signals needs to be observable  
The disciplinary role of markets requires allowing for failure of individual institutions within the 
context of a credible resolution regime that limits its wider impact both in the financial sector 
and the general economy, while also limiting moral hazard. In order to fulfill these objectives, 
the absolute priority of claims needs to be protected so that shareholders need to be first in 
taking losses and creditors know ex ante the repayment priority (Hart, 2002). It is for this 
reason that a number of legal scholars have argued for reliance upon traditional bankruptcy 
statutes or, at least, special laws designed for banks, which still include some involvement of 
the Courts of Justice in the actual insolvency procedures rather than the bank closure model 
                                                                          
4. The G-20 reform agenda for improving the resilience of the international financial system includes the objective of a 
single set of global accounting standards by June 2011. In the European Union, harmonization has taken place in the 
recent years to comply with the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). In addition, EU bank prudential 
supervisors aim at streamlining financial reporting under IFRS, focusing on harmonization of reporting formats and 
convergence of supervisory reporting requirements. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 14 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 1202 
based exclusively on special administrative rules. Only under a regime that secures the priority 
of claims would creditors be fully able to evaluate their risk and market spreads would 
effectively reflect the differences in the probability of default and loss given default of individual 
institutions (i.e. a government bail-out would yield PD = 1 and LGD = 0 ex post). In order to 
secure creditors´ risk monitoring and PD ≠ 0 and LGD ≠ 0, Hart and Zingales (2010) propose 
a resolution mechanism in which all non systemic creditors receive a haircut of at least 20%. 
Furthermore, a prompt corrective action policy on the part of prudential supervisors not only 
helps to protect the value of the assets and reduce bank managers’ incentives to engage in 
moral hazard behavior (Benston and Kaufman,1988 and Kaufman, 2004) but also limits the 
probability of systemic spill over to the extent that depositors have access to their funds, 
qualified borrowers can make use of their existing credit lines and their collateral and 
counterparties can settle their hedging contracts. Moreover, by allowing markets to continue 
functioning, prompt corrective action and a credible resolution regime preserves the 
information value of market indicators for policy makers.  
A widely cited body of research shows that investors in subordinated debt appear to 
rationally discriminate between different risk profiles of banks, which imply that banks´ 
unsecured creditors consider themselves at risk. Only in these circumstances, creditors 
would have ample incentives to fully exploit that information and incur the costs to analyze it. 
Hence, the potential for market discipline relies not only on the assumption that publicly 
available information reflects in a timely and adequate manner financial institutions´ risk profiles 
but also on the assumption that investors in unsecured debt have no limitations on analyzing 
that information and do not suffer from co-ordination failure when monitoring. Retail investors 
are more likely to have these limitations and, for this reason, the market discipline potentially 
provided by customer depositors may be close to valueless. In the context of the present 
crisis, the lack of a credible resolution regime for allocating banks’ losses to groups  
of creditors has compelled governments to bail-out all creditors of banks in order to pre-empt 
runs that could have threatened the stability of the financial system as a whole. Hence, the 
relevance of understanding the impact of governments´ bail-out on market signals. 
Balasubramnian and Cyree (2010) analyze the sensitivity of yield spreads on bank-issued 
subordinated notes / debentures and trust preferred securities (TPS)5 to the “Too-big-to fail” 
(TBTF) policy in the US. The authors conclude that prior to the TPS issuance and the LTCM 
intervention, yield spreads of subordinated notes / debentures were sensitive to conventional 
firm-specific default risk measures, but not after. The government´s intervention in the LTCM 
signaled the return of implicit guarantees in spite of the existing credible resolution regimen 
established in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991.  
The principle that creditors need to be at risk for effective market discipline has 
inspired academics to propose approaches that make it mandatory for financial institutions 
to issue subordinated debt on an a regular basis, arguing that the quality of the signal 
obtained may be improved. More recently, Flannery, 2005; Squam Lake Working Group on 
Financial Regulation (2009); Hart and Zingales (2010) propose market-based corrective 
mechanisms, which include the financing of a given percentage of financial institutions´ 
balance sheet by unsecured debt that includes convertibility into stock (going concern) 
and/or bail-in procedures in a recovery situation. Contingent capital instruments (Flannery, 
2009; Squam Lake Working Group on Financial Regulation, 2009) would provide automatic 
recapitalization via mandatory conversion of debt into equity either at supervisors´ discretion 
or automatically when a predetermined trigger based on market conditions is activated. Bail 
                                                                          
5. Hybrids included in the definition of T1 capital. In the US, banks started issuing TPS in 1996. 
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in approaches establishes mandatory write downs of banks´ Tier 1 non common equity  
and unsecured debt at supervisors´ discretion at the point of non viability. In the Hart and 
Zingales proposal, the loss absorption capacity applies to all “non-systemically relevant” 
obligations (e.g. long-term debt). These approaches are better suited to deal with tail risks. 
To the extent that triggers are based on market signals, such mandatory requirements 
under a rule-based regime together with a credible resolution process for failed institutions 
would provide the adequate incentives to shareholders and uninsured creditors to engage 
in risk analysis and act consequently (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1: Comparison between Squam Lake Working Group (2009) and the Hart and Zingales 
(2010) proposals 
 
 Squam Lake Report (2009) Hart and Zingales (2010) 
Differences  
Approach Contingent capital Bail-in 
Trigger  Market price of equity 
 Accounting value 
 Prudential supervisor decision 
CDS premium + Supervisor  
based on stress test 
Action taken Debt converts into equity Resolution / Take over 
Similarities  
  Mechanism shifts gov´t trade off between restructuring and bail out in 
favor of restructuring 
 Limits systemic risk (Probability and/or cost) but do NOT address 
problems of all institutions having problems simultaneously 
 Regulatory requirement additional cushion of Jr LT debt: 
extraprotection + financial instrument –mkt price- 
 Effectiveness relies on rule based PS + credible resolution regime 
Source: Author´s analysis 
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3 Balance sheet and market indicators in macroprudential policy: The relevance 
of market discipline   
Borio and Drehmann (2009) argue that the ideal measurement tool of financial instability 
would permit generating the ex ante probability distribution of financial distress and the  
ex post identification of financial instability. These authors conclude that there are no 
satisfactory models of the economy as a whole linking balance sheets of the financial sector 
to macroeconomic variables. As a result, policy makers need to rely on to a variety of much 
more limited quantitative tools to measure financial instability, such as balance sheet and 
market indicators.  
Balance sheet indicators of financial institutions are mainly obtained from audited 
statements and regular call reports submitted to supervisors. This raises questions about  
the public availability (call reports are not public in numerous countries) and quality of the 
information (audit statements are mostly required for banks quoted on the stock market) as 
well as about its timeliness since call reports, supervisors assessments and audited financial 
statements are only available at certain times and may not represent the actual financial 
condition at all times.  
In contrast, market indicators, although only available for financial institutions that 
obtain finance from the market, are not only publicly available but also are available at high 
frequency (at least daily). As an example, in the European Union (EU), out of the total of 
almost 7,800 institutions6, 54 banks have Credit Default Swaps (CDS) traded in the market 
(see Annex 1), 312 banks are listed in the stock markets and 737 banks have outstanding 
debentures as of September 2010. Market indicators can be used directly or they can be 
used to obtain estimates of PD. However, CDS spreads reflect factors other than credit risk 
such as liquidity risk and market conditions (e.g. risk aversion).  
Market prices and balance sheet indicators as measuring tools of systemic 
importance 
One facet of systemic risk is the propagation of adverse shocks through the rest of the 
financial system (and the real economy). The failure of some financial institutions considered 
systemically important can create systemic risk. The ideal measure of systemic importance 
must capture the potential spill overs or contagion effects from the institution whose systemic 
importance we want to measure to the rest of the financial system. Such measure is of 
utmost importance for macroprudential regulation whose main objective is that systemically 
important institutions internalize the costs that their failure imposes on others including the 
costs associated with moral hazard. However, measuring systemic importance faces mainly 
two methodological challenges: (i) the time dependence character of systemic importance 
and (ii) the difficulty to separate the externalities that the failure of a large firm can cause on 
the financial system (spill overs) and the externalities associated with common exposure to a 
common shock (common exposure effects). These challenges render the ex ante assessment 
of systemic importance very difficult. Goodhart refers to the “fuzzy outlines of the definition of 
systemic importance.”  
                                                                          
6. As per the ECB definition of credit institutions, it includes the credit institutions incorporated under the law on any EU 
country regardless whether or not they are subsidiaries of foreign banks but excludes foreign branches of EU and non 
EU banks.  
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Broadly speaking, there are three approaches to measure systemic importance 
(Castro and Ferrari, 2010). First, the indicator approach uses quantitative indicators such as 
total assets, total interbank operations, trading securities or fee and commission income7 that 
proxy for factors that policy makers consider ex ante as determinants of systemic importance 
such as size, interconnectedness and substitutability. The balance sheet indicators are highly 
positively correlated. Scores of each indicator and financial institution are used to produce a 
synthetic measure of systemic importance that captures the structural rather the cyclical 
aspect of systemic importance. The main limitations are the considerable data gaps 
particularly for interconnections among financial institutions including non banks. 
Secondly, the network approach uses the network theory to map interconnections 
between financial institutions. The simulation of shocks to specific institutions allows policy 
makers to assess the domino effects on other institutions in the network. This approach 
allows for a better identification of the exposure to a common shock and the spill over. The 
main limitations in terms of data gaps are the same as in the case of the indicator approach.  
Thirdly, market information based approaches use the information content of market 
prices such as CDS spreads and equity prices as inputs to assess the systemic importance 
of financial institutions. These approaches have received considerable attention by academics 
and policy makers because of the public availability and frequency of market data for those 
financial institutions that tap the markets. While balance sheet data are considered lagging 
indicators in terms of the information they incorporate, the information content of market 
prices is superior to the extent that markets are informationally efficient and incorporate both 
public and private information. Moreover, to the extent that they embed views about common 
exposures and interactions among financial institutions (at least on the financial system as a 
whole), market information based approaches can bridge the information gaps of indicator 
based and network approaches. In sum, market information based approaches are useful  
for macroprudential policy even if only as a complement to other measures of systemic 
importance.  
Market prices and balance sheet indicators of financial instability  
The main objective of macroprudential policy is to limit systemic risk by reducing the 
probability of financial distress occurring. The effectiveness of macroprudential measures  
of financial instability depends in part to the extent that they are “leading” measures of 
financial distress (Borio and Drehman, 2009). In order to be useful as forward looking 
indicators, balance sheet indicators need to be incorporated into a model of the dynamics 
of financial instability. Rating agencies use these publicly available balance sheet indicators 
to elaborate their own assessment of the strength of the financial system as a whole that is 
intended to be forward looking to the extent that ratings are not “sticky” because they use 
methodologies based on “through the cycle” PD.8 The measure of strength of the financial 
system is the bottom up aggregation of each financial institution individual rating. Hence, 
this measure does not take into consideration the interconnections between financial 
institutions and potential domino effects.  
Market prices present their own limitations as indicators of financial distress. For 
example, CDS spreads reflect factors other than “the collective view of credit risk” (IMF, 2006) 
and policy makers need to know the exact causes that explain changes in CDS spreads in 
                                                                          
7. These indicators are not an all encompassing list.  
8. Individual ratings are estimates of the probability of default. The measure of strength of the financial system is the 
bottom up aggregation of each financial institution individual rating.  
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order to use them as indicators of financial instability. Annaert et alli. (2010) study the 
determinants of the changes in CDS spreads of euro area credit institutions and analyze  
the marginal contributions of credit risk, liquidity, market conditions and business cycle 
factors over the period 2004-08. The authors conclude that determinants of banks´ CDS 
spreads vary strongly across time. If policy makers base their policy action on CDS spreads 
changes (e.g. Increase capital requirements; margin calls), CDS spreads need to be re-
estimated frequently. Moreover, the market liquidity component explains changes in CDS 
spreads before and after the financial crisis and, in the period immediately before the crisis, 
CDS changes hardly seemed to be explained by economically sensible variables, undermining 
their usefulness as indicators of financial distress.  
Market prices can also be used to derive estimates of the probabilities of default for 
individual institutions or the financial sector. These estimates are designed to be forward 
looking, at least to the extent that policy changes are made public and policy makers do act 
within the established policy framework. Policy makers´ intervention (e.g. bail out) outside that 
framework results in paradigm changes in the determinants of both ratings and market prices. 
This hinders their use as macroprudential indicators. In sum, balance sheet indicators, CDS 
spreads and ratings are rather imperfect measures of future financial distress. 
In fact, one of the main challenges that macroprudential policy makers face is that 
the market discipline of potential bank failure and creditors´ loss absorption apply both to 
small but also to large and complex institutions, while still avoiding systemic risk. Precisely, 
the Squam Lake Working Group (2009) and Hart and Zingales (2010) proposals aim at 
correcting the market perception of government intervention (i.e. bail out) and the resulting 
paradigm changes in the determinants of both ratings and market prices. The proposals 
would fulfill this objective to the extent that supervisors use triggers in a transparent and 
predictable fashion and, to the extent that conversion rates deter shareholders ex ante 
excessive risk taking. In turn, the conversion at supervisors’ discretion reduces the 
attractiveness for investors to the extent that supervisors maintain flexibility in determining 
when regulatory capital is insufficient, for example, if conversion relies on the results of stress 
tests that are not public. In this regard, it is worth making a reflection on the recent proposal 
by the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision to ensure the loss absorbency of regulatory 
capital at the point on non-viability (August, 2010) whose success also heavily relies on the 
regulatory transparency to estimate trigger breaches. The market signals from all non-
common Tier 1 instruments and Tier 2 instruments compliant with the Basel proposal will be 
signals of the market's perception of the probability that the supervisors will trigger write-
downs and not solely a market signal about the actual financial condition of the issuer. 
Importantly, this will likely mean that the market signal from the pricing of otherwise identical 
instruments issued by banking groups in different countries will not necessarily be 
comparable. Indeed, if supervisors do not have a time consistent rule based policy for banks 
over time, the market signals may not even be comparable within a country.  
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4 Policy conclusions 
In spite of their many limitations as described in this paper, balance sheet indicators and 
market prices, whether “raw” or as part of a methodology, are under consideration as 
measuring tools in macroprudential policy. In particular, balance sheet indicators and market 
prices are used as structural measures of systemic importance. The usefulness of these 
indicators to inform policymakers´ decisions resides heavily on the ability of markets to price 
the risk profile of the financial institutions themselves and to take into consideration risk 
factors that go beyond individual financial institutions, including shock correlations and 
interactions between institutions in their response to shocks. Reliance on market prices  
as indicators of systemic importance and financial distress implicitly assumes markets are 
perfectly efficient in their strong form. Moreover, policymakers should only rely on market 
prices to provide meaningful signals about systemic risk if they have a reliable way of 
separating out the impact of implicit government guarantees beyond the existing legal 
framework of the safety net, including a credible resolution regime. Against this background, 
market discipline is a necessary, if not sufficient, condition, to ensure the information quality of 
balance sheet and market indicators. In this respect, market discipline has a supporting role 
in macroprudential policy. 
In general, three conditions are necessary for market discipline to be effective: 
adequate and timely information on financial institutions´ risk profile; financial institutions´ 
creditors must consider themselves at risk; and the reaction to market signals needs to be 
observable. More specifically, the following policy initiatives would greatly contribute to 
enhancing effective market discipline: external auditors and prudential supervisors to enforce 
not only honest accounting consistent with the applicable accounting standards but also 
accounting frameworks that allow for the prompt recognition of losses. In normal market 
circumstances, fair value accounting of balance sheet (and off-balance sheet) items better 
reflects fundamental values than amortized cost accounting. However, in times of crisis and 
thin markets, market prices are driven by liquidity provision incentives and not fundamental 
values, and mark-to-market values cannot be used to gauge the solvency of financial 
institutions as a “going concern.” In financial crisis situations, market prices should be 
supplemented with both model-based and amortized cost valuations. Publication of stress 
testing of banks´ financial statements would contribute to the transparency of discrepancies 
between fair value and amortized cost accounting. The benefits of these options should be 
assessed against the costs of lengthy and difficult-to-comprehend annual reports.  
Financial information needs to be sufficient and comparable in terms of valuation 
criteria for assets, liabilities and off-balance sheet items since the definition of a systemically 
important institution is global. This demands convergence between accounting standard-
setters over global accounting rules. Because macroprudential policy takes into consideration 
shock correlations and interactions between institutions in their response to common shocks, 
financial information on “interconnectedness” and “substitutability” among financial institutions 
- including non-banks - is necessary. Such information could reveal strategic decisions, and 
managers could be reluctant to provide it to the market out of concern over competitiveness. 
As compared to markets, prudential supervisors have a comparative advantage in making the 
disclosure of private information by financial institutions obligatory. Policymakers could use 
this private information on “interconnectedness” and “substitutability” to supplement the 
signaling content of market prices. 
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Prompt corrective action by supervisors limits the probability of systemic spillover to 
the extent that market participants can fully anticipate policymakers´ reaction. Moreover, by 
allowing markets to continue functioning, prompt corrective action and a credible resolution 
regime also preserve the information value of market indicators. In the case of liquidation, the 
absolute priority of claims needs to be legally protected. In such a regime, creditors know  
ex ante the repayment priority. All of this challenges the view that crisis management policies 
are only relevant when the crisis has unfolded and, hence, they are not pre-emptive in their 
orientation and as such outside the scope of macroprudential policy. Such a view neglects 
the preventive policy aspects of crisis resolution. 
Creditors of financial institutions have to consider themselves at risk. Only in these 
circumstances would creditors have ample incentives to fully exploit the information available 
in the market and incur the costs to analyze it. Against this background, prudential regulators 
should consider mandatory requirements of financial institutions that a given percentage of 
their balance sheet be financed by long-term debt which includes convertibility into stock 
(going concern) and/or bail-in procedures in a recovery situation. Ideally, triggers for 
conversion and/or bail-in should be based prima facie on market prices.  
Supervisors´ communication of their monitoring and systemic assessments to 
financial institutions, including the stress tests and communication of the changes in the 
stringency of their policy measures to the market, could improve the information content  
of balance sheet indicators and market prices. Furthermore, by influencing the behavior of 
market participants, supervisors´ communication may help to contain system-wide risks.  
These policy recommendations are not intended to be an all-encompassing list of 
reforms to improve the information content of market prices and balance sheet indicators. 
Other aspects that demand policy attention and would result in enhanced market discipline 
are, among others, moving key markets to organized exchanges where possible, improving 
the transparency of OTC markets and, in general, reducing incentives in order to avoid 
regulatory arbitrage. 
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ANNEX 1:  LIST OF EU BANKS WITH LARGEST AVG. NOTIONAL CDS QUOTED  
IN THE MARKET (SEPTEMBER, 2010) 
Allied Irish Banks PLC DnB NOR Bank ASA 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA Rabobank Nederland NV 
Banco Comercial Portugues SA Barclays Bank PLC 
Banco Santander SA Caja de Ahorros y Monte de Piedad de Madrid 
Anglo Irish Bank Corp Ltd 
Governor & Co of the Bank of Ireland/The 
BAWAG PSK Bank fuer Arbeit und Wirtschaft  
             und Oesterreichische Postsparkasse 
Lloyds TSB Bank PLC Landesbank Baden-Wuerttemberg 
HSBC Bank PLC Fortis Bank SA/NV 
Standard Chartered PLC Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA 
BNP Paribas Royal Bank Of Scotland NV 
Natixis Bayerische Landesbank 
Societe Generale FCE Bank PLC 
UniCredit SpA ING Bank NV 
Banco Espirito Santo SA Caja de Ahorros de Valencia Castellon y Alicante 
Mediobanca SpA SNS Bank NV 
Commerzbank AG Banco de Sabadell SA 
Deutsche Bank AG Banca Italease SpA 
Dresdner Bank AG Nordea Bank AB 
UniCredit Bank AG Banco Popolare SC 
NIBC Bank NV Standard Chartered Bank 
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB Royal Bank of Scotland PLC/The 
Svenska Handelsbanken AB Dexia Credit Local 
Banca Nazionale del Lavoro SpA HBOS PLC 
Alpha Bank AE Credit Agricole SA 
Danske Bank A/S WestLB AG 
IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG Unione di Banche Italiane SCPA 
Erste Group Bank AG  
Raiffeisen Zentralbank Oesterreich AG  
Intesa Sanpaolo SpA 
  
Source: Dealogic. 
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